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In re Grand Jury Proceedings1:  The Semantics of “Presumption” and “Need.” 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Less than one month following the Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Nixon2 and ten days after Richard Nixon’s resignation,3 scholar Alan Westin boldly 
predicted the obvious: “[the Court’s] definition of executive privilege promises to be a 
source of fertile legal and political disputes in the future.”4   Five presidents and twenty-
four years later, the doctrine of executive privilege remains volatile and controversial.5  
In the midst of the high stakes battle over information between the Clinton 
administration and the Office of the Independent Counsel,6 the judiciary was again 
drawn into the fray in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.7 
 
The issue of secrecy8 in a president’s execution of Article II duties9 dates to the 
                                                 
1  5 F. Supp. 2d. 21 (D.D.C. May 27, 1998) (Nos. 98-095(NHJ), 98-096(NHJ), 98-097(NHJ)), 
rev'd on other grounds, In re Lindsey, 1998 WL 719542 (D.C.Cir. Jul 27, 1998) (No. 98-3060, 98-
3062, 98-3072), cert. denied by, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 1998 
WL 541012 (1998) (No. 98-316).  
2  418 U.S. 683 (1974).  The Supreme Court ordered President Nixon to produce the 
infamous White House tape-recordings for in camera  inspection by the Federal District Court 
for the District of Columbia, setting the first and only high court precedent relative to 
executive privilege. 
3  President Richard M. Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, 1974, in the midst 
of the Watergate scandal.  The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683 (1974) played a significant role in Nixon’s resignation.  Alan Westin, The Case for 
America, in UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT at xi (Leon 
Friedman ed., 1974). 
4  Id. at xi-xii. 
5  For a comprehensive bibliography of scholarly literature on the topic of executive 
privilege which was published in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra controversy, see Mark J. 
Rozell, Executive Privilege: A Bibliographic Essay, 4 J.L. & POL. 639 (1988). 
6  See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.   
7  5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). 
8  For discussions on secrecy in government, see A CULTURE OF SECRECY,  THE 
GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Athan G. Theoharis ed., University 
Press of Kansas 1998) (discussing initiatives to ensure that bureaucratic interests in secrecy 
do not impair historical research endeavors); MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, 
TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977) (arguing that governmental 
secrecy demands regulation outside the executive branch); JOHN M. ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL 
SECRECY AND DECEPTION, BEYOND THE POWER TO PERSUADE (1980) (evaluating presidential 
uses of secrecy from the Kennedy through the Ford administrations and offering guidelines 
for democratic accountability through legislation). 
9  The President’s powers and duties are enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution: 
SECTION 2.  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
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infancy of the federal government under the Constitution.10  Throughout history, 
presidents periodically have refused to disclose information requested by the Congress 
and the courts.11  The issue of secrecy in the executive branch came to a head during 
the Watergate scandal of the Nixon administration.12  In the immediate aftermath of 
Watergate, the competing interests of democratic accountability and federal separation 
of powers provided the framework for arguments over the existence of executive 
privilege.13  Today, those competing interests shape the arguments over the boundaries 
                                                                                                                         
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to 
the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment. 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law 
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during 
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of 
their next Session. 
SECTION 3.  He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the 
State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he 
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene 
both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with 
Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall 
think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of 
the United States. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, §3. 
10  MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 32-36 (1994).  In 1796, George Washington refused to comply with a 
congressional request for information regarding secret executive communications made in 
contemplation of the Jay Treaty.  Id. at 35.  Washington discussed withholding information 
from Congress as early as 1792 in response to a congressional inquiry into the military 
expeditions of General Arthur St. Clair.  Id. at 32-34. 
11  For a concise history of presidential assertions of executive privilege, see id. at 32-48. 
12  For a concise history of the Watergate scandals, see Frank Tuerkheimer, Watergate as 
History, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1323, 1324-27 (reviewing STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF 
WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990)). 
13  See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH Pg. #1 (1974).  
2
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of executive privilege.14 
 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings15 provides a glimpse into the doctrine of executive 
privilege and demonstrates that the doctrine does not exist in a vacuum.16  Each 
                                                                                                                         
Berger argues that the power of the executive branch to withhold information from the 
coordinate branches of government does not exist by express provision in the Constitution, 
nor may be it implied from the enumerated powers of Article II.  Id.; see also  Raoul Berger, 
Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1043 (1965); Raoul Berger, 
The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4, 29 (1974); DAVID WISE, THE 
POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER 64 (1973).  For pre-
Watergate discussions of executive privilege, see Joseph W. Bishop Jr., The Executive’s 
Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Paul 
Hardin, III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Robert Kramer 
& Herman Marcuse, Executive Privilege - A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 623 (1961). 
14  See generally ROZELL supra  note 10.  Some scholars have argued in favor of legislation 
fixing the boundaries of executive privilege.  See e.g. James Hamilton and John C. Grabow, A 
Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes Precipitated by 
Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (1984).  Conversely, Rozell argues that 
legislative action “is bound to fail given the impossibility of determining all of the 
circumstances under which executive privilege may be exercised in the future.”  ROZELL, supra 
note 10, at 147.  Moreover,  “Congress already has the institutional capability to challenge 
claims of executive privilege by means other than eliminating the right to withhold information 
or attaching statutory restrictions on the exercise of that right.”  Id. at 148.  Given the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of a qualified executive power to withhold information, any limitation on 
that power may be unenforceable as a violation of separation of powers.  Id.; cf.  GERALD 
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366 (13th ed. 1997) (questioning 
whether Congress would have authority under the necessary and proper clause to enact 
guidelines for the negotiation of executive agreements with foreign nations).  For example, if a 
President exercises his power to withhold certain information in a manner permissible under 
United States v. Nixon but impermissible under a statutory restriction, the President could 
argue that the statute is unconstitutional “as applied.”  Id.  Since the Court held that the 
Executive’s power to withhold certain information is rooted in the President’s Article II 
powers, it is conceivable that Congress lacks the authority to restrict that power.  Id.   
15  5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). 
16  ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 154.  “Two executive privilege claims that, on the surface, 
appear equally valid may be treated very differently from one another given different 
circumstances.”  Id.; see also , Westin, supra  note 3, at xii-xiv.   
When the political situation is too dangerous for the Supreme Court (e.g., if a ruling 
against the President is likely to be disobeyed by him or to produce serious reprisals 
against the Court’s powers or prestige), the Court should find a way to duck the 
issue or deflect it, leaving its immediate resolution to the larger political process.  
But if the political situation is favorable (that is, if a ruling against the President will 
enjoy broad public and Congressional support and virtually compel presidential 
compliance), then the Court is free (if the case warrants it) to do the two things most 
3
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presidential assertion of executive privilege involves unique political circumstances,17 as 
well as a specific procedural posture which have profound effects on the balancing of 
interests in each case.18  The media and partisan politicians have greeted modern 
presidential assertions of executive privilege with self-serving comparisons to 
Watergate,19 causing more than one president to temper or even disguise the privilege in 
an effort to avoid negative political ramifications.20  
 
This note analyzes the District Court of the District of Columbia’s application of the 
doctrine of executive privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.21  Part II provides a 
                                                                                                                         
beloved by judges - uphold the ‘rule of law’ against claims of prerogative or 
privilege by the executive, and expand still further the discretionary power of the 
judiciary in the American constitutional system. 
Id. at xii-xiii.   
In other words, the Supreme Court generally tends to be a prudent body; it has had 
to be for the unique power of judicial review to have survived so long in a majority-
rule republic.  But when one of the fundamental tenets of the American 
constitutional system is widely regarded by the public as under assault by one of 
the elected branches of national government, the Justices can and do unite in 
defense of such basic values.   
Id. at xiv. 
17  R.H. Clark, Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger, 8 AKRON L. REV. 324, 327 (1975).  
Executive privilege claims arise in two distinct circumstances:  first, when the executive 
refuses to disclose information to the legislative branch; and second, when the executive 
refuses to disclose information to the judicial branch.  Id.  This note deals exclusively with the 
latter situation.      
18  Westin, supra  note 3, at xiv.   
19  ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 62-63.  Ironically, the doctrine of Executive Privilege 
entrenched itself during the 1950’s in part as a response to “McCarthyist” congressional 
investigations.  Clark, supra  note 17, at 325.  President Eisenhower used the public’s distrust 
of congressional investigations to justify numerous assertions of executive privilege.  Id. 
20  See generally Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the 
Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631 (1997) (arguing that 
congressional abuse of investigatory power has weakened the President’s constitutional 
power to withhold information); see also  ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 140-141. 
21  5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).  A second issue in In re Grand Jury Proceedings was 
the applicability of government attorney-client privilege and the “work product doctrine.” at 
Id. at 30.  The district court held that the government attorney-client privilege is a qualified 
privilege, and found that the Office of the Independent Counsel demonstrated a sufficient 
showing of need to overcome the privilege.  Id. at 39.  Accordingly, the court compelled the 
grand jury testimony of White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey.  Id. at 39.  The White House 
has appealed the district court’s decision exclusively challenging the attorney-client privilege 
and work product rulings.  Peter Baker and Ruth Marcus, Appeals Court Hears Privilege 
Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1998, at A5.  On June 4, 1998, the Supreme Court declined a 
request by the Office of the Independent Counsel for a direct appeal to the high Court, stating 
4
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brief history of executive privilege and discusses precedents that impacted the court’s 
decision.22  Part III indicates the procedural posture of the case and sets forth the 
substantive facts.23  Part IV discusses the court’s analysis of the executive privilege 
issue in light of recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions.24  Part V concludes 
that In re Grand Jury Proceedings bolstered the notion of a presumption in favor of the 
privilege, while observing that the sufficiency of the evidence presented to overcome 
the privilege must be evaluated in retrospect.25   
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Executive privilege is fundamentally a product of the doctrine of separation of 
powers.26  The issue arises when the executive branch refuses to disclose information 
to a coordinate branch of government.27  While executive privilege issues most 
commonly develop as conflicts between Congress and the executive branch,28 the 
judicial branch remains the ultimate arbiter in the context of constitutional inter-branch 
disputes.29   
 
The judicial branch did not encounter a formal assertion of executive privilege until 
                                                                                                                         
“[i]t is assumed that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.”  
United States v. Clinton, 118 S.Ct. 2079, 2080 (1998) .  The D.C. Circuit heard arguments on 
June 29, 1998.  Peter Baker and Ruth Marcus, Appeals Court Hears Privilege Case, WASH. 
POST, June 30, 1998, at A5.  In a later opinion, the D.C. Circuit qualified the district court ruling 
on attorney-client privilege.  See In re Lindsey, 1998 WL 719542 (D.C.Cir. Jul 27, 1998) (No. 98-
3060, 98-3062, 98-3072).  The Supreme Court then denied certiorari letting stand the lower 
court ruling that White House lawyers cannot refuse to answer a federal grand jury's 
questions about possible crimes committed by government officials.  Office of the President 
v. Office of Independent Counsel, --- S.Ct. ---, 1998 WL 541012 (Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).  
However, the executive privilege issue was not the subject of the President s appeal.   
22  See infra  notes 26-53 and accompanying text. 
23  See infra  notes 54-86 and accompanying text.  The court redacted a large portion of the 
opinion relative to the specific information sought by the Independent Counsel.  Thus, the 
substantive facts surrounding the motion to compel are not entirely clear. 
24  See infra  notes 87-153 and accompanying text  
25  See infra  notes 154-157 and accompanying text.  
26  See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 10, at 142. 
27  BERGER, supra  note 13, at 1. 
28  Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1396 (1974). 
29  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  Without the 
authority of Congress, President Truman ordered certain steel mills seized in an effort to end a 
labor dispute that threatened the American war effort in Korea.  Id. at 583.  The Supreme Court 
ordered the Secretary of Commerce to return the mills to private ownership despite the 
President’s argument that the threat to national security justified use of inherent executive 
power.  Id. at 587. 
5
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1807 in United States v. Burr.30  The Burr court recognized judicial power to require 
the president to produce evidence,31 and it qualified that power by observing that a 
court is not required “to proceed against the president as against an ordinary 
individual.”32  While modern practitioners, judges, and scholars have debated the 
precedent set by Burr and other non-judicial “precedents” of executive privilege,33 the 
courts did not pass on the issue again until Watergate.34 
                                                 
30  25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (prosecuting Colonel Aaron Burr for treason stemming 
from his involvement in a secessionist conspiracy).  Id.; see Paul A. Freund, The Supreme 
Court, 1973 Term - Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 24-31 (1974).  
The Supreme Court hinted as to the existence of the privilege four years earlier “where Chief 
Justice Marshall suggested that for a court to intrude ‘into [the secrets] of the cabinet’ would 
give the appearance of  ‘intermeddl[ing] with the prerogatives of the executive.’ ”  In re 
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 170 (1807)). 
31  Cox, supra note 28, at 1392. 
32  Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708.  The Burr 
court further noted that the discretion to withhold portions of the disputed letter rested 
exclusively in the President, and not in other members of his cabinet.   Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192.  
But cf. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (extending the privilege to 
communications between advisers).  For a discussion of In re Sealed Case, see infra note 51. 
    
33  For a concise history of presidential assertions of executive privilege, see ROZELL, 
supra note 10, at 32-48.  Rozell argues that the frequent exercise of the power lends legitimacy 
to the “philosophical and constitutional underpinnings of executive privilege.”  Id. at 32; see 
also UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 319-20, 353-62 
(Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter The President’s Main Brief].  In the context of 
executive usurpation of legislative authority, the Supreme Court recognized implied 
congressional acquiescence as a justification for actions taken by the Carter administration 
during the Iranian hostage crisis.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981).  
But see BERGER, supra note 13, at 165. (arguing that these “precedents” amount to usurpation 
of power).  “Frequent and uncritical repetition of dubious doctrine transforms it into accepted 
dogma.”  Id. 
34  In the context of the Watergate scandal, the courts addressed the issue of executive 
privilege in In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), modifying 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that the judicial branch 
holds the constitutional power to determine applicability of executive privilege and ordering 
President Nixon to produce the White House tape-recordings for in camera  inspection);  
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 
1973) (holding that a subpoena issued by the committee was unenforceable against President 
Nixon because the subpoenaed material was not critical to the committee’s performance of its 
legislative functions); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff’g 366 F.Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that tape-recordings 
of White House discussions regarding the 1971 May Day demonstrations were presumptively 
privileged, but that the plaintiffs demonstrated a specific need for the tapes that overcame the 
6
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In United States v. Nixon,35 the Supreme Court finally dealt squarely with a 
presidential assertion of executive privilege.  While President Nixon argued for an 
absolute and unqualified privilege rooted in separation of powers principles,36 the United 
States argued that an unqualified executive privilege did not exist in any form.37  The 
unanimous Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he President’s need for complete candor 
and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts,”38 and, 
accordingly, the court recognized the existence of executive privilege.39  However, the 
Court rejected Nixon’s argument for an absolute privilege,40 and it adopted a 
                                                                                                                         
privilege); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding 
legislation preserving presidential documents and tape-recordings and establishing a system 
of judicial and public access to the materials); and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) 
(holding that a former president was entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for his 
official acts).  For a commentary on the impact of the judiciary on the Nixon presidency and a 
discussion of the Watergate litigation, see HOWARD BALL, NO PLEDGE OF PRIVACY: THE 
WATERGATE TAPES LITIGATION (1977). 
35  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
36  The President’s Main Brief, supra  note 33, at 350-73.  The President argued in the 
alternative that if the privilege was a qualified privilege, that privilege prevailed over the 
subpoena duces tecum.  Id. at 373-79.  Ironically, Richard Nixon had spoken out against any 
constitutional basis for exe cutive privilege while serving as a congressman.  Norman Dorsen 
& John H.F. Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 
1-2 (1974). 
37  UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 210, 262-69 
(Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter The United States’ Main Brief ].  Special Prosecutor 
Leon Jaworski, arguing on behalf of the United States, urged the Court to recognize executive 
privilege as a qualified evidentiary privilege rather than a constitutionally based privilege..  Id. 
 Jaworski was appointed Special Prosecutor after President Nixon forced the removal of the 
first Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox.  See Tuerkheimer, supra  note 12, at 1325. 
38  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. 
39  Id. at 708.  “The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”  Id.  Although Nixon 
was a unanimous decision, historical accounts reflect a reluctance on the part of Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and White to recognize a constitutional basis for the doctrine of executive 
privilege.  HOWARD BALL, “WE HAVE A DUTY,” THE SUPREME COURT AND THE WATERGATE 
TAPES LITIGATION 143-44 (1990).  Initially, the three Justices believed it was unnecessary to 
reach the issue of the constitutional basis of the privilege when a common law basis for the 
privilege existed.  Id.  Ultimately, the three reluctant Justices signed the unanimous opinion.  
Id. at 149.  “More than likely they ran out of time and, probably, energy in their efforts to 
persuade the others that the Court should not be strengthening the presidency through the 
judicial creation of the inherent power of executive privilege.”  Id. 
40  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. 
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as 
against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a 
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and 
7
Popson: In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
presumption in favor of the privilege41 as a reflection of judicial deference to the 
executive branch.42  In criminal cases, the privilege may be overcome by a sufficient 
showing of need by the party seeking disclosure.43 
 
While Nixon44 remains the exclusive Supreme Court authority on executive privilege, 
the district and circuit courts of the District of Columbia have developed a body of case 
law expounding on the framework of Nixon.45  The D.C. Circuit expanded the umbrella 
of privilege to include not only communications between president and adviser, but also 
“communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate 
White House adviser’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for 
investigating and formulating the advice to be given to the President on the particular 
matter to which the communications relate.”46  The D.C. Circuit supported its 
expansion of the privilege to advisers arguing that such confidentiality ensures candid, 
blunt communication in discussing policy alternatives.47  The court recognized that 
                                                                                                                         
nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable 
government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III. 
Id. at 707. 
41  Id. at 708. 
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and 
correspondence . . . has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy 
of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the 
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential 
decisionmaking.  A President and those who assist him must be free to explore 
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in 
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.  These are the 
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
Id. 
42  Id. at 708.  “[I]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the 
president as against an ordinary individual.”  Id.  (quoting U.S. v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 192 
(C.C.D.Va. 1807)); see also  ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 152.     
43  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706; see also  infra notes 142-151 and accompanying text. 
44  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
45  See U.S. v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1976); U.S. v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); U.S. v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501 
(D.D.C. 1989); U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1990); U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. 
Supp. 142 (D.D.C. 1990); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Sealed Case, 
107 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom.; 
Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998); Association of American Physicians & 
Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
46  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The D.C. Circuit has also 
determined that the First Lady is an “adviser” for purposes of executive privilege.  
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 904-05 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993).     
47  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 750.   
8
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these conversations often take place without the participation of the President, yet they 
are necessary to ensure that sound, well-reasoned advice ultimately reaches the 
President.48  Although Nixon49 involved the application of the privilege in the context of 
a criminal trial,50 the D.C. Circuit has held that the standards are equally applicable in 
the context of grand jury proceedings.51  
 
Against this backdrop of policy and precedent, the District Court of the District of 
                                                 
48  Id.  The court also outlines the arguments against expanding the privilege to 
communications between advis ers.  Id. at 748-49.  First, the Constitution vests executive 
power exclusively in the President.  Id. at 748.  “Since the Constitution assigns these 
responsibilities to the President alone, arguably the privilege of confidentiality that derives 
from them also should be the President’s alone.”  Id.  The privileges of the President have 
traditionally expanded beyond those of other executive branch officers.  Id.  While the 
President enjoys absolute immunity for official acts, other executive branch officers receive 
only qualified immunity.  Id.  “[F]or purposes of separation of powers, the President stands in 
an entirely different position than other members of the executive branch.”  Id. at 749 (quoting 
In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  Second,  courts generally adhere to the 
premise that privileges should be narrowly construed.  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749.  
“[E]xceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”  Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 
710).  Further, the growth of the executive branch in the past few decades arguably justifies a 
narrow construction of the privilege.  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749.  Finally, a privilege 
which encompasses presidential aides and advisers increases the potential for abuse of the 
privilege.  Id. 
49  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
50  The Court emphasized the “fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair 
administration of criminal justice” in its decision to order the production of the White House 
tapes.  Id. at 713. 
51  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 743 [hereinafter Espy].  Secretary of Agriculture Michael 
Espy was the subject of a grand jury investigation into allegations that Espy “improperly 
accepted gifts from individuals and organizations with business before the United States 
Department of Agriculture.”  Id. at 734.  In response to the public accusations of wrongdoing 
in the Department of Agriculture, President Clinton ordered an internal White House 
investigation to determine the appropriateness of executive action against Espy.  Id. at 735.  
The results of this internal investigation became the subject of a grand jury subpoena.  Id.  
When the Clinton administration invoked executive privilege, the unique issue presented to 
the court was whether the privilege encompassed certain documents comprised of 
communications between advisers, as opposed to communications between the President and 
his advisers.  Id. at 749-50.  The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Wald, vacated 
and remanded a District Court ruling upholding the White House’s claim of privilege.  Id. at 
762.  Although the D.C. Circuit agreed that the communications at issue were presumptively 
privileged, the court vacated and remanded on grounds that the District Court erred in 
holding that the Independent Counsel failed to demonstrate a sufficient need for the 
evidence.  Id.  
9
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Columbia faced yet another assertion of the privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.52 
 As the Independent Counsel’s investigation of the Clinton administration trudged 
forward, the focus of the judicial inquiry shifted away from the communicator of the 
information, and toward the nature of communication at issue.53 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
In January 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed Independent Counsel54 
Robert B. Fiske to investigate alleged financial improprieties on the part of President 
Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton relative to a failed development project known as 
“Whitewater.”55  Kenneth Starr56 replaced Fiske on August, 5 1994 when Fiske’s term 
                                                 
52  5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). 
53  Id. at 26-27; see also  infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text. 
54  The statutory authority for appointment of an Independent Counsel is contained in the 
Ethics in Government Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.  § 592(c) states: 
(1)  Application for appointment of independent counsel.  The Attorney General 
shall apply to the division of the court for the appointment of an independent 
counsel if- 
(A)  the Attorney General, upon completion of a preliminary investigation under 
this chapter, determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
further investigation is warranted; or 
(B)  the 90-day period referred to in subsection (a)(1), and any extension granted 
under subsection (a)(3), have elapsed and the Attorney General has not 
filed a notification with the division of the court under subsection (b)(1). 
In determining under this chapter whether reasonable grounds exist to 
warrant further investigation, the Attorney General shall comply with the 
written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with 
respect to the conduct of criminal investigations. 
28 U.S.C. § 592(c). 
55  Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Partners Face Fraud Charges; McDougals’ Indictment 
Cites Land Deals, WASH. POST, August 18, 1995, at A1.   
In 1978, then Arkansas Attorney General Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton joined with Jim 
and Susan McDougal to borrow over $200,000 to purchase a tract of land in Ozark Mountains 
with the intention of developing vacation homes.  Id.  The group organized as the Whitewater 
Development Corporation.  Id.  When Bill Clinton was elected Governor, he appointed Jim 
McDougal to the post of Economic Development Director.  Id.  Clinton lost his reelection bid 
in 1980.  Id.  In 1982, McDougal purchased a small savings and loan, while Clinton was again 
elected Governor.  Id.   
Federal regulators began questioning the stability of McDougal’s savings and loan 
institution in 1984, and McDougal hired the Rose Law Firm, where Hillary Clinton was a 
partner, to work for the struggling savings and loan.  Id.  In the fall of 1985, Susan McDougal 
borrowed $300,000 from a loan company operated by David Hale, a Democratic municipal 
judge.  Id.  This loan company was backed by federal funds through the Small Business 
Administration.  Id.  On her loan application, Susan McDougal indicated the purpose of the 
10
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expired.57 A United States Court of Appeals panel of judges58 refused to re-appoint 
Fiske because of a potential conflict of interest.59   
 
The Starr probe eventually expanded to encompass allegations of perjury and 
obstruction of justice involving sexual impropriety on the part of the President.60  On 
                                                                                                                         
loan was to finance her fledgling marketing company.  Id.  However, the funds were actually 
plowed back into Jim McDougal’s burgeoning real estate corporation and the floundering 
Whitewater project.  Id.  Hale later claimed that Bill Clinton pressured him into making the 
loan.  Id.   
Problems at the savings and loan mounted over the late 1980’s, and eventually it collapsed 
in 1989.  Id.  Meanwhile, Susan McDougal claimed she attempted to convince the Clintons to 
get out of the Whitewater project in 1987, but Hillary Clinton refused.  Id.  For several years in 
the mid-1980s, the Clintons allegedly took improper tax deductions on the Whitewater 
property, claiming interest payments actually made by Whitewater Development Corporation. 
 Id.   Jim McDougal was indicted on federal fraud charges related to activities at the savings 
and loan, and acquitted in 1990.  Id.  In 1992, a Clinton presidential campaign report claimed 
losses on the Whitewater property around $60,000.  Id.  This report became a topic of dispute 
as Jim McDougal claimed that he heavily subsidized the venture, limiting the Clintons losses. 
 Id.  Three years of delinquent Whitewater corporate tax returns were filed in June of 1993.  Id. 
  
Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster, who worked on the Whitewater problem for 
the Clintons and was formerly employed by the Rose Law Firm, committed suicide a month 
later.  See generally CHRISTOPHER RUDDY, THE STRANGE DEATH OF VINCENT FOSTER (1997).  
Federal investigators were denied access to Foster’s office immediately following the 
discovery of his body, while White House aids entered the office soon thereafter and 
removed some files.  Id. at 134.  In December of 1993, the White House agreed to turn over the 
Whitewater documents to the Justice Department, including the files removed from the office 
of Foster.  Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Clinton Releases Files on Land Deal; Access to 
Papers is Limited to Justice Dept., WASH. POST, December 24, 1993, at A1.   Hale and the 
McDougals were eventually convicted of fraud in connection with the improper loan to Susan 
McDougal.  See generally JIM MCDOUGAL & CURTIS WILKIE, ARKANSAS MISCHIEF (1998).  
56  Kenneth Starr served as a law clerk for former Chief Justice Warren E. Berger (1975-
1977), Counselor to the attorney general of the United States Department of Justice (1981-
1983), judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1983-1989), and 
Solicitor General for the Department of Justice (1989-1993) before being named Independent 
Counsel.  WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 4091 (51st ed. 1997).   
57 Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel; Ex-Solicitor General 
Starr to Take Over Probe, WASH. POST, August 6, 1994, at A1. 
58  This special division of the United States Court of Appeals was created by statute.  See 
generally 28 U.S.C. § 49.  The panel consists of three judges who are appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court.  28 U.S.C. § 49(d).  One judge must be appointed from the D.C. 
Circuit, and no count may have more than one judge sitting on the panel.  Id.      
59  The conflict of interest arose because Fiske was appointed by Attorney General Janet 
Reno, who in turn served at the behest of the President.  Schmidt, supra  note 57. 
60  Pursuant to the Paula Jones litigation, White House intern Monica Lewinsky signed a 
11
Popson: In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
February 18, February 19, and March 12, 1998, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce 
Lindsey testified before the grand jury in Washington D.C., but he refused to answer a 
number of questions regarding Monica Lewinsky,61 the civil case Jones v. Clinton,62 
and the Independent Counsel’s investigation.63  The White House asserted executive 
                                                                                                                         
January 7, 1998 affidavit denying sexual relations with the President.  On January 12, 1998, the 
Independent Counsel received certain “allegations” 
(i) that Ms. Lewinsky had had a sexual relationship with President Clinton; (ii) that a 
friend of the President has advised Ms. Lewinsky on how to respond to her 
subpoena in the Jones case, found an attorney to represent her, and helped her find 
a new job; and (iii) that Ms. Lewinsky had tried to persuade Linda Tripp, a witness 
in the Jones suit, to commit perjury. 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, U.S. v. Clinton, 118 S.Ct. 2079 (1998) 
(No. 97-1924), in Washingtonpost.com Special Report: Clinton Accused (last modified 
May 28, 1998) <http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/petition052898.htm>.  [hereinafter OIC’s Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari].  On January 16, 1998, the Special Division of the United States Court 
of  Appeals conferred jurisdiction on the Office of the Independent Counsel to 
investigate “whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, 
intimidated witnesses or otherwise violated federal law.”  Id.  President Clinton provided 
deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), on January 17, 
1998.  Memorandum of the White House in Opposition to OIC’s Motion to Compel, In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, Nos. 98-095, 98-096, 98-097, in Washingtonpost.com Special 
Report: Clinton Accused (last modified May 28, 1998)  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/whitehouse 
052898. htm> at *4 [hereinafter Memorandum of the White House].  The President was 
asked questions regarding Lewinsky in the course of his deposition testimony.  Id. 
61  Monica Lewinsky served as a White House intern in the Clinton administration until her 
removal following the surfacing of allegations of impropriety.  Susan Schmidt et al., Clinton 
Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny 
Alleged Affair to Jones’s Lawyers, WASH. POST, January 21, 1998, at A1.  On July 28, 1998, 
Lewinsky agreed to testify before the grand jury in exchange for immunity.  Peter Baker & 
Susan Schmidt, Lewinsky Gets Immunity for Her Testimony; Sources say Clinton to Tell of 
Clinton Bid to Hide Affair, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at A1.  The Independent Counsel’s 
subpoena issued to President Clinton on July 17, 1998 was withdrawn after the President 
agreed to provide videotaped testimony on August 17, 1998 from the White House.  Don Balz 
& Susan Schmidt, Prosecutor, President Face Off Lewinsky’s Immunity Deal Sets Stage for 
Historic Confrontation, WASH. POST, August 2, 1998, at A1.  On September 9, 1998, the 
Senate convened a hearing to discuss the legal basis and procedure for impeachment 
proceedings against the President.  George Lardner Jr.,  Senate Hearing Debates 
Impeachment Process,  WASH. POST, September 10, 1998, at A13.  For the  report of 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, see Referral to the United States House of 
Representatives (Office Independent Counsel), available in 1998 WL 614815.   
62  869 F. Supp 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d in part by, Jones v. Clinton 72 F.3d 1359 (8th Cir. 
(Ark.) 1996). 
63  OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra  note 60, at *5. 
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privilege and attorney-client privilege on behalf of Lindsey who refused to answer 
pertinent questions.64  On February 26, 1998, presidential assistant Sydney Blumenthal65 
appeared before the grand jury, and he likewise asserted executive privilege in refusing 
to answer questions regarding Lewinsky, Jones, and the Independent Counsel’s 
investigation.66   
 
The Independent Counsel filed motions with the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to compel the testimony of Lindsey, Blumenthal, and a third 
individual67 regarding Lewinsky, Jones, and the Independent Counsel’s investigation.68  
The White House responded with a memorandum in opposition to the motions to 
compel,69 and the Independent Counsel followed with a reply memorandum in support 
of the motion to compel.70  The District Court for the District of Columbia held closed 
hearings on the motions, and, in its opinion and order entered May 4, 1998, granted the 
motions to compel the testimony of Lindsey and Blumenthal.71  The White House filed 
motions for reconsideration which were denied on May 26, 1998,72 and the district 
court released the redacted opinion73 the following day.74 
 
In contrast to the lengthy memorandum submitted by the White House, the brief 
reply memorandum submitted by the Independent Counsel urged the court to adopt a 
bright line rule for determining whether presidential communications are presumptively 
privileged.75  The Independent Counsel argued that “[e]xecutive privilege is flatly 
inapplicable to a President’s private conduct,”76 and he placed the burden of 
                                                 
64  Id. 
65  Sydney Blumenthal was a journalist until President Clinton tabbed him as an assistant 
in July of 1997.  Blumenthal worked on the staffs of New Yorker magazine, the Washington 
Post, New Republic, and Vanity Fair.  Howard Kurtz, The Clintons’ Pen Pal S.D. Blumenthal 
Leaving Journalism to work for the White House, WASH. POST, June 16, 1997, at C1.   
66  OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra  note 60, at *5. 
67  The third unidentified party later withdrew his claims of privilege thereby rendering the 
motion moot as to his testimony.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
68  OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *5.    
69  The memorandum was submitted on behalf of the White House by attorneys W. Neil 
Eggleston and Timothy K. Armstrong.  Memorandum of the White House at *29. 
70  OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *5. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at *3. 
73  The opinion is marked by significant redactions because of the sensitive nature of the 
information at issue in the case.   
74  OIC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at *3. 
75  The “presumption” of executive privilege is discussed infra PART  IV. A. 
76  Independent Counsel’s Motion to Compel at *2, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Nos. 98-
095, 98-096, 98-097, in Washingtonpost.com Special Report: Clinton Accused (last modified 
May 28, 1998) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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demonstrating the official nature of the conduct on the shoulders of the Executive.77  In 
the alternative, the Independent Counsel asserted that the showing of need would be 
sufficient to overcome the privilege.78      
 
Conversely, the White House argued that “[t]he critical question is not the nature of 
the underlying conduct; it is the purpose of the advice being given.”79  From this 
premise, advice sought “to deal with the threat of impeachment” is “official” advice.80   
 
Although the showing of need was sufficient in Nixon81 to overcome the 
presumption of privilege, the White House reminded the court that the conversations 
about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters were “not about 
an official function of the President,” but were nonetheless presumptively privileged.82   
 
                                                                                                                         
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/lindsey052898. htm> [hereinafter, OIC’s Motion to 
Compel]; see also  Dorsen & Shattuck, supra  note 36, at 31.   
77  OIC’s Motion to Compel, supra note 76, at *2. 
In trying to bar the testimony of White House aides, the President advances a 
theory that is breathtaking in scope.  Executive privilege applies here, according to 
the President, because the allegations of purely private matters have had “a 
demonstrable effect on the operations of the White House as an institution.”  Under 
this reasoning, every potential White House scandal can be shrouded in the 
Executive privilege.  If a President were to murder a political opponent, he could 
argue that the resulting uproar could impair his legislative program, distract him from 
his duties, affect his dealings with foreign heads of state, and potentially give rise to 
impeachment proceedings - the very arguments raised by the White House here. 
Id. at *1-2. 
78  Id. at *2. 
79  Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *2; see also  ADAM CARLYLE 
BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INFORMATION 109 
(1974). 
80  Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *2.  Some commentators have 
attempted to distinguish communications which contain “advice” from communications 
which contain “facts.”  See, e.g., Dorsen & Shattuck, supra  note 36, at 31.  Separating “facts” 
from “advice” is difficult, but not impossible.  Id.  The executive branch engages in this 
process often under the Freedom of Information Act.  Id.  “Without this separation, the 
advice privilege invites abuse.”  Id.  Where facts are inextricably intertwined with the policy 
making process, secrecy should prevail.  Id.  However, “[t]here should be no executive 
privilege when Congress has already acquired substantial evidence that the information 
requested concerns wrong-doing by executive officials or presidential aids.”  Id.  The Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is sufficient protection for executive officials 
accused of wrong-doing.  Id. 
81  418 U.S. 683 (1974).  For a dicussion of the Supreme Court’s justification for the 
presumption of privilege, see supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
82  Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *17. 
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The White House rejected any notion that the President bears the burden of 
establishing the official nature of his conduct to raise a presumption of privilege,83 yet it 
offered examples of how discussions related to the Lewinsky matter fell within the 
rubric of the President’s Article II duties.84  Moreover, the White House concluded that 
the Independent Counsel could not make a “focused demonstration of need”85 sufficient 
to overcome the presumption in favor of the privilege.86    
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The District Court for the District of Columbia87 rejected the bright line rule 
advocated by the Independent Counsel, resolving the “presumption” issue by construing 
Nixon88 and In re Sealed Case89 to impose a duty on the court to treat the 
communications at issue as presumptively privileged.90  However, the rationale 
supporting the ruling on presumption91 provides little guidance in discerning the role of 
the presumption in privilege claims.92  The court discussed the scope of the privilege 
                                                 
83  Id. at *18. 
84  The proffered examples included discussions relating to: the President’s State of the 
Union Address (the President decided not to discuss the matter in his address),  
Memorandum of the White House,supra note 60, at *23-24, “matters of foreign policy and 
military affairs” Id. (responding to inquiries from foreign nations regarding the Lewinsky 
matter and “[d]eliberations within the White House about how to keep the controversy 
related to the Lewinsky matter from hampering the President’s conduct of the nations military 
and foreign policy. . . .”); impeachment, Id. at *24-25; allocation of presidential time, Id. at *25-
26 (how to minimize the interference created by the Jones litigation); strategy discussions 
relating to the Independent Counsel Investigation, Id. at *26-27 (“. . . these discussions 
formed an on-going part of the advisor’s function to counsel the President on decisions he 
must make . . .”); “discussions as to whether to assert executive privilege,” Id. at *26-27 (“. . . 
these discussions occurred while advising the President in connection with a decision only 
he could make in his official capacity . . .”).  The White House offered the examples “solely for 
illustrative purposes,” asserting that “[n]othing in Nixon or [In re] Sealed Case suggests that 
the question whether a particular issue calls for direct involvement and decisionmaking by the 
President is amenable to judicial review” or “open to question after the fact by the OIC.”  Id. 
at *23.   
85  The phrase “focused demonstration of need” is quoted from Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 746.  
For a discussion of requisite demonstration of need, see infra notes 147-153 and 
accompanying text. 
86  Memorandum of the White House, supra note 60, at *29. 
87  The opinion was authored by Chief United States District Judge Norma Holloway 
Johnson. 
88  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
89  Espy, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
90  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1998).  
91  Id.  
92  See infra notes 95-136 and accompanying text. 
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relative to the President’s advisers, holding that Blumenthal and Lindsey fell within the 
rubric of executive privilege.93   The court concluded the analysis of executive privilege 
by holding that the Independent Counsel demonstrated a specific need for the 
information in the context of the grand jury investigation which outweighed the interests 
of the executive in non-disclosure.94 
 
A.  The Presumption of Privilege 
 
Governmental secrecy provides a convenient vehicle for abuse of power.95  Abuse 
of power breeds public distrust of government.96  Arguments favoring a narrow 
construction of the “presumption” reflect a distrust of government rooted in past 
abuses of power.97  In particular, the abuses of the Watergate scandal left many with a 
jaded view of presidential privilege claims.98  The public distrust of government created 
in the wake of Watergate has fueled arguments in favor of a presumption against the 
privilege.99    
 
A second concern voiced in support of a restricted construction of the 
“presumption” involves accountability in government.100  Information hidden from the 
public would not be considered in evaluating the performance of the elected 
president.101  Thus, when voters cast ballots in ignorance of the truth, the president is 
effectively “unaccountable” to the electorate.102  Despite the compelling arguments 
                                                 
93  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27. 
94  Id. at 28-30. 
95  See generally WISE, supra  note 13 (arguing that democracy will work only if those 
consenting to be governed know what they are consenting to). 
96  Id. at 342.  Wise states that a Knight newspaper study in 1970 (three years before the 
Watergate scandal) reported that a substantial number of Americans did not believe the 
United States actually landed men on the moon. Id. at 341.  “Government deception, 
supported by a pervasive system of official secrecy and an enormous public relations 
machine, has reaped a harvest of massive public distrust.”  Id. at 342. 
97  David B. Frohnmayer, Essays on Executive Privilege, in SAMUEL POOL WEAVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES, NO. 1 (American Bar Foundation 1974).  “Modern history 
demonstrates that the constitutional or legal obligations which presidents have asserted to lie 
within an ‘official capacity’ are breathtakingly sweeping in scope.”  Id. at 3. 
98  ROZELL, supra note 10, at 142.  “[T]he doctrine of executive privilege has fallen into 
disrepute because of the [leadership] abuses of one presidency.”  Id.   
99  HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra  note 8, at 104.  “The presumptions must be turned around. 
 Whatever is needed for public debate must be made public.  The burden must be on those 
who would keep a secret.”  Id.   
100  See WISE, supra note 13, at 64.  “[Secrecy] permits [the President] to control 
information . . . and to filter the truth before it reaches Congress and the voters.”  Id. 
101  ORMAN, supra note 8, at 195.   
102  Cf., WISE, supra note 13, at 345.  “[E]ven if the truth later emerges, it seldom does so in 
time to influence public opinion or public policy.”  Id; see also  ORMAN, supra note 8, at 195.   
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favoring a narrow construction of the “presumption,”103 courts have systematically 
interpreted the “presumption” liberally.104  In delineating the presumption in favor of 
executive privilege, the Supreme Court did not directly address the concerns of public 
distrust of government and democratic accountability.105  Likewise, the D.C. Circuit 
has refrained from framing its opinions on the presumption in terms of public trust and 
democratic accountability.106  In re Grand Jury Proceedings follows suit by strictly 
adhering to precedent in finding the presumption applicable.107 
 
Judicial indifference to “trust” and “accountability” rationales reflects the role of the 
courts under separation of powers doctrine.108  The concerns expressed in favor of a 
narrow construction of the presumption are legitimate, but courts should view 
executive privilege with “a dispassionate and thoughtful perspective on the powers and 
duties of the presidency as an institution, rather than as a reflection of a particular 
incumbent.”109  In Nixon, the Supreme Court justified the presumption as a guardian of 
candid advice and creativity in the executive branch.110 
 
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,111 the district court adopted the White House 
                                                 
103  See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. 
104  See, e.g., Espy, 121 F.3d at 744 “The President can invoke the privilege when asked to 
produce documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and 
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.  If the President does 
so, the documents become presumptively privileged.”  Id. 
105  See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-713. 
106  See cases cited supra  notes 34 & 45. 
  
107  5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1998). 
Under Nixon, the Court has a duty to treat the subpoenaed testimony as 
presumptively privileged.  In light of this binding precedent, the factual similarities 
between the Nixon cases and the case at hand, and the evidence submitted with 
respect to the President’s invocation of privilege, this Court finds that it must treat 
the communications of Lindsey and Blumenthal as presumptively privileged. 
Id. 
108  See ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 142-47.  “[O]nly a proper understanding of the separation 
of powers doctrine can help resolve the inherent conflict between governmental secrecy and 
the ‘right to know.’”  Id. at 145. 
109  Ellen M. Stanton, Executive Privilege: An Institutional Perspective, in SAMUEL POOL 
WEAVER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES, NO. 1, at 19 (American Bar Foundation 1974); see also 
Cox, supra note 28, at 1410-11. 
110  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708; see also  Cox, supra  note 28, at 1410.  Aside from this “candid 
interchange” doctrine, national security and foreign affairs matters have traditionally 
supported executive privilege claims.  Colleen B. Grzeskowiak, Note, Executive Privilege and 
Non-Presidential Actors: The Distress of “Tidy-Minded Constitutionalists” Continues, 38 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 991, 996-97 (1987).  
111  5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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argument that “no court had ever declined to treat executive communications as 
presumptively privileged on grounds that the matters discussed involved private 
conduct.”112  The focus of the inquiry is not on “the nature of the conduct that the 
subpoenaed material might reveal,”113 but rather on the context in which the information 
is sought and the degree to which the material is necessary to achieve the appropriate 
goals of the proceeding.114 
 
By shifting the focus toward “the context in which the information is sought” and 
away from “the nature of the conduct,” the courts maintain flexibility by avoiding a 
precise boundary for executive privilege.115  The presumption is designed to “confine 
the inroads upon executive confidentiality so narrowly as to minimize possible injury to 
the Presidency.”116  In assessing the “context in which the information is sought,”  the 
court drafted a distinction between conversations “involv[ing] private conduct”117 and 
“purely private conversations.”118  The court found that the former are entitled to a 
presumption of privilege, while the latter are not.119  Recognizing the need of the 
President “to address personal matters in the context of his official decisions,”120 the 
court rejected the Independent Counsel’s construction of the presumption of 
                                                 
112  Id. at 25.  The court went on to acknowledge the White House assertion that Nixon 
recognized a presumption despite the arguably unofficial nature of the Watergate break-in.  
Id. 
113  Id.  
114  Id. (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities , 498 F.2d at 730).  
“In other words, the nature of the presidential conduct at issue, whether it was official or 
private, appeared not to affect the presumption of privilege or the need stage of the D.C. 
Circuit’s executive privilege analysis.”  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
115  See ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 143.  “[T]here are no clear, precise constitutional 
boundaries that determine . . . whether any particular claim of executive privilege is 
legitimate.”  Id.  “Such a power cannot be subject to precise definition because it is 
impossible to determine in advance all of the circumstances under which presidents may have 
to exercise that power.”  Id. 
116  Cox, supra note 28, at 1411. 
117  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26. 
118  Id.  (emphasis added).  In holding “purely private” conversations are not 
presumptively privileged, the court relied on Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 
425, 449 (1977) (noting that the privilege is “limited to communications ‘in performance of [a 
President’s] responsibilities,’ ‘of his office,’ and made ‘in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions’ “); Espy, 121 F.3d at 752 (“Of course, the privilege only applies to 
communications that these advisers and their staff author or solicit and receive in the course 
of performing their function of advising the President on official government matters”). 
119  5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26.  The most common justification for the privilege focuses on the 
need for candor in executive deliberations.  See, e.g,. Cox, supra note 28, at 1410.  However, in 
Nixon “the Supreme Court added an interest in privacy - a concern never thought to lessen 
the duty of an ordinary citizen.”  Id. 
120  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
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privilege121 as “oversimplified.”122   
 
The court defended its position on the presumption issue by noting that a 
determination of the “private” or “official” nature of the communications was 
impossible absent an in camera proceeding.123  However, an in camera proceeding is 
not available unless the Independent Counsel demonstrates a sufficient need for the 
requested evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of the privilege.124  In other 
words, in camera review is not available to determine whether the presumption applies, 
but it is only available to overcome the presumption.125  Therefore, the burden of 
proving a “purely private” conversation fell on the Independent Counsel without the 
benefit of in camera review.126   
 
The court distinguished this case from Espy127 on the grounds that the latter 
involved a subpoena of documents, while the former involved a subpoena of 
testimony.128  Claiming an inability to review the potential testimony of the witnesses in 
camera, the court reasoned that its “ability to assess whether the subpoenaed materials 
relate to official decisions is thus greatly hindered.”129  Unfortunately, this rationale 
creates an inference that if the evidence sought by the Independent Counsel existed in 
the form of documents rather than testimony,130 in camera inspection would be 
available to determine whether the communications “related to official decisions.”131  
                                                 
121  See supra  note 77 and accompanying text. 
122  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28.  The Supreme Court rejected a 
similar argument in Nixon.  BRECKENRIDGE, supra  note 79, at 147.  The prosecutor  “argued 
that the President had an enforceable legal duty to comply and under no circumstances could 
executive privilege be invoked on either the alleged illegal activities or those relating to the 
political campaign.  Campaign activities, he insisted, were not a constitutional duty and thus 
not protected.”  Id. at 146-47. 
123  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28.  “The Court does not have 
documents or tapes to review in camera  that could establish whether the content of the 
subpoenaed communications relates only to private matters . . . [t]he Court is aware of only 
the unanswered questions themselves.”  Id. at 26. 
124  See, e.g.,  Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 498 F.2d at 730 
(stating “[P]residential conversations are ‘presumptively privileged,’ even from the limited 
intrusion represented by in camera  examination of the conversations by a court”). 
125  Id. 
126  Cf., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28. 
127  121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  For a discussion of Espy, see supra  note 51. 
128  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
129  Id.  It is unclear why the court did not recognize its power to compel the in camera  
testimony of the witnesses, just as it may compel the in camera  inspection of documents.  
See BRECKENRIDGE, supra  note 79, at 152-53. 
130  The evidence at issue in Espy, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997), consisted strictly of 
documents.   
131  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27. 
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Such an inference would be inconsistent with requiring the party seeking disclosure to 
demonstrate the “purely private” nature of the communications before an in camera 
inspection.132   
 
The practical result of the court’s holding relative to the presumption is that an 
invocation of executive privilege by a president will invariably raise a presumption in 
favor of the privilege.133  It is unlikely that a party seeking disclosure could demonstrate 
that conversations between the president and an adviser related exclusively to private 
matters.134  Ultimately, the presumption in favor of the privilege reflects the need to 
protect the institution of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers,135 while at the same time retaining the capacity of the courts “to pose as a 
viable check on executive abuses of the privilege.”136 
 
B.  The Scope of the Privilege 
 
Executive privilege encompasses not only communications between the president 
and his advisers,137 but also certain communications between advisers pursuant to 
providing advice to the president.138  Certain conversations between Bruce Lindsey 
                                                 
132  See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  “Presidential conversations are 
‘presumptively privileged,’ even from the limited intrusion represented by an in camera  
examination of the conversations by a court.”  Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730 (1974). 
133  Cf., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 25-27.  The presumption is 
“sustained by reason and authority.”  Cox, supra  note 28, at 1410; see also supra  note 104. 
134  If the party possesses proof of the content of the conversations, they probably fail the 
“demonstrated specific need portion of the analysis.  See infra notes 147-53. 
135  See generally Stanton, supra note 109 (arguing that executive privilege is an 
institutional privilege that preserves federal ideals of separation of powers). 
136  ROZELL, supra note 10, at 152.  
137  BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 79, at 110.  “The advice privilege is fundamental to 
executive privacy and presidents insist that discussions with advisers must be fully 
protected.”  Id. 
138  Espy, 121 F.3d at 752.  The extension of the privilege to include such communications 
has been criticized.  See Recent Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 861 (1998).  Critics argue that other 
privileges such as the deliberative process privilege are sufficient to protect communications 
between advisers, rendering extension of the presidential communications privilege 
unnecessary.  Id. at 861.  The deliberative process privilege is a common law privilege that 
protects “documents and other materials that would reveal ‘advisory opinions, 
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental 
decisions and policies are formulated.’ ”  Id. at 865-66 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 
550, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  “Unlike the presidential communications privilege, which throws a 
blanket of confidentiality over all communications among officials of a certain level, the 
deliberative process privilege protects only those communications that relate to executive 
decisionmaking.”  Id. at 866. 
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and an unnamed third party did not occur “in conjunction with the process of 
advising the President,” and therefore fell beyond the scope of the privilege.139  
Thus, Lindsey could not avoid answering questions regarding these particular 
conversations by asserting the presidential communications privilege.140  However, 
conversations between Lindsey and Mrs. Clinton, as well as conversations between 
Sydney Blumenthal and Mrs. Clinton, were held within the scope of the privilege.141 
    
 
C.  The Independent Counsel’s Showing of Need 
 
In opening its “need” analysis, the Court reiterated the long standing rule that the 
presumption in favor of executive privilege “may be rebutted by a sufficient showing of 
need by the Independent Counsel.”142  The Court carefully points out the vague 
standard announced in Nixon requiring a “demonstrated, specific need” for the evidence 
sought.143  Relying on the Nixon line of cases144 and the Espy case,145 the Court 
required the Independent Counsel to first show “that each discrete group of the 
subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence; and second, that this evidence 
is not available with due diligence elsewhere.”146  
                                                 
139  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1998).  The content of these 
conversations was redacted from the opinion. 
140  Id.  The doctrine of executive privilege encompasses not only a “presidential 
communications” privilege, but also a “deliberative process” privilege which protects 
communications made in the executive decisionmaking process.  Russell L. Weaver & James 
T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 MO. L. REV. 279, 279 (1989); see also supra 
note 138. 
141  See supra  note 46 and accompanying text. 
142  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 713); Espy, 121 F.3d at 742; Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate 
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d at 730.   
143  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  The “demonstrated, specific need” 
discussed in  Nixon reflects the Supreme Court’s recognition of a conflict between coequal 
branches.  Clark, supra  note 17, at 336.  While the President implores secrecy as a necessity to 
carry out his constitutional responsibilities under Article II, the courts must obtain evidence 
to discharge its constitutional responsibilities under Article III.  Id.  For a discussion of the 
imprecision of the Nixon standard, see Cox, supra  note 28, at 1414.  One judge has 
commented that the Nixon standard is so vague that “the Court does not appear to have 
meant anything more than the showing that satisfied [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 
17(c).”  United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also infra  note 148.    
144  See supra  note 34.  “[T]hese opinions balance[d] the public interests served by 
protecting the President’s confidentiality in a particular context with those furthered by 
requiring disclosure.” Espy, 121 F.3d at 753. 
145  121 F.3d 729. 
146  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 754).  
“These elements must be shown ‘with specificity.’ ” Id.  (quoting  Espy, 121 F.3d at 756).  
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This two prong analysis developed as the D.C. Circuit construed the meaning of a 
“demonstrated, specific need “ over the course of two decades.147  The first 
requirement is essentially the equivalent of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c),148 
and, therefore, it does not serve as a major obstacle to a sufficient showing of need.149  
The second requirement entails detailed documentation of efforts to obtain the needed 
information from other sources.150  If the Independent Counsel satisfies the two prong 
test, the court orders the subpoenaed party to testify provided the testimony will 
“produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s 
investigation.”151  Upon reviewing the information sought by the Independent Counsel 
and the explanations of why the inquiries were directed at the White House, the court 
held that the testimony of Bruce Lindsey and Sydney Blumenthal was “likely to contain 
relevant evidence that is important to the grand jury’s investigation”152 and granted the 
                                                                                                                         
“The information sought need not be critical to an accurate judicial determination.”  Id.  
(quoting  Espy, 121 F.3d at 754). 
147  See supra  notes 34 & 45 and accompanying text .  “The [Nixon cases] employed a 
balancing methodology in analyzing whether, and in what circumstances, the presidential 
privilege can be overcome.  Under this methodology, these opinions balanced the public 
interests served by protecting the President’s confidentiality in a particular context with those 
furthered by requiring disclosure.”  Espy, 121 F.3d at 753. 
148  FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) merely limits a subpoena to relevant information, stating:  
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects.  A subpoena may also 
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, 
documents or other objects designated therein.  The court on motion made promptly 
may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.  The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects 
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial 
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their 
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be 
inspected by the parties and their attorneys.  
 Id. 
149  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  But see Cox, supra note 28, at 1414-
15.  Cox points out two additional prerequisites.  First, the case must involve “serious criminal 
charges against high government officials.”  Id. at 1415.  Second, in the criminal context, there 
is “already an implicit determination, based upon evidence aliunde, of probable cause to 
believe that the officials named as defendants have committed serious crimes.”  Id. 
150  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  The D.C. Circuit has recognized that 
in situations where an immediate White House adviser is under investigation for alleged 
criminal conduct, the second requirement should easily be met.  Id.  
151  Id. (quoting U.S. v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991)).  Ordinarily, the initial 
burden is on the subpoenaed party to demonstrate the unreasonableness of a grand jury 
subpoena.  R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 301.     
152  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 29.  “The OIC has been authorized to 
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motion to compel.153   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Executive privilege lies at the crossroads of politics and the law, and it remains one 
of the murkiest and misunderstood areas of constitutional law.154  Beyond the lack of 
recent Supreme Court guidance on the applicable standards regarding executive 
privilege, the political undercurrents of the day assure the doctrine’s volatility.155  In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings illustrates the dilemma encountered by the courts when faced 
with balancing the competing interests which arise when a President asserts the 
privilege.156   
                                                                                                                         
investigate whether Monica Lewinsky ‘or others,’ including President Clinton, suborned 
perjury, obstructed justice, or tampered with witnesses.”  Id.  “The testimony sought and 
withheld based on executive privilege is likely to shed light on that inquiry, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory.”  Id. 
153  Id.  An evaluation of the Court’s ruling relative to the Independent Counsel’s 
demonstration of need will only occur in retrospect.  This heavily redacted portion of the 
opinion defies comprehensive analysis.  However, the court commented that “if the President 
disclosed to a senior advisor that he committed perjury, suborned perjury, or obstructed 
justice, such a disclosure is not only unlikely to be recorded on paper, but it also would 
constitute some of the most relevant and important evidence to the grand jury investigation.” 
 Id.  This tiny portal provides a mere glimpse into the ex parte submission of the Independent 
Counsel. 
154  See ROZELL, supra  note 10, at 1. 
155  In light of the political ramifications associated with a Presidential claim of privilege, 
the lower courts may likely continue to shape the law of executive privilege.  Cf., ROZELL, 
supra note 10, at 140-141.  “No post-Watergate administration has been willing to take an 
aggressive posture toward executive privilege to reestablish the political viability of that 
constitutional doctrine.  Clearly, each administration has perceived the political costs to be 
too great.”  Id. at 140.  The inevitably partisan nature of the issue promotes uncertainty in 
determining the applicable standards in individual cases.  See Michael Nelson, Forward to 
MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC  
ACCOUNTABILITY ix, ix-x (1994). 
From the 1930s until the 1960s, an era in which the Democrats usually controlled the 
White House, executive privilege was championed by liberals and opposed by 
conservatives.  During the 1970s and 1980s, when Republican presidents were the 
norm, conservatives and liberals changed sides on the issue and, often, exchanged 
arguments: conservatives who had once emphasized the dangers of executive 
privilege and found no basis for it in the Constitution now saw what liberals had 
previously seen (but no longer saw) namely, that executive privilege is inherent in 
the executive power.  (Liberals, for their part, found the abandoned conservative 
arguments suddenly persuasive).   
Id. 
156  For a discussion of the competing interests at stake relative to executive privilege, see 
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While representing victory for the Executive in terms of bolstering the presumption 
in favor of the privilege,  the case also represents defeat in terms of the President’s 
quest for confidentiality.  Ultimately, executive privilege is a doctrine which safeguards 
the presidency, but not necessarily the President.157  
 
James M. Popson 
                                                                                                                         
generally Dorsen & Shattuck, supra  note 36. 
157  Stanton, supra  note 109, at 31.  “[In In re Grand Jury Proceedings] it appears the 
privilege is being used with regard to personal, not governmental matters, to protect Mr. 
Clinton politically rather than to protect the institution of the presidency.”  Marcia Coyle, 
Author: Privilege Argument Weak , NAT’L L.J., May 18, 1998, at A10 (quoting Mark Rozell).  
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